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Abstract: In a repeated game with imperfect public information, the set of equilibria 
depends on the way that the distribution of public signals varies with the players’ actions.  
Recent research has focused on the case of “frequent monitoring,” where the time interval 
between periods becomes small. Here we study a simple example of a commitment game 
with a long-run and short-run player in order to examine different specifications of how 
the signal distribution depends upon period length. We give a simple criterion for the 
existence of efficient equilibrium, and show that the efficiency of the equilibria that can 
be supported depends in an important way on the effect of the player’s actions on the 
variance of the signals, and whether extreme values of the signals are “bad news” of 
“cheating” behavior, or “good news” of “cooperative” behavior. 
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1. Introduction  
In  a  repeated  game  with  imperfect  public  information,  the  set  of  equilibria 
depends on the way that the distribution of public signals varies with the players’ actions.  
When considering the case of “frequent monitoring,” where the time interval between 
periods  becomes  small,  it  seems  natural  to  suppose  that  the  distribution  of  signals 
changes in some way as the time period shrinks.  In this paper, we model the dependency 
of  the  information  structure  on  the  period  length  by  supposing  that  there  the  players 
observe the state of a fixed continuous-time process at the start of each period, and that 
this process is either Poisson or a diffusion.     
Intuitively,  if  the  public  signal  is  “sales”  or  “revenues,”  it  corresponds  to  the 
aggregate of a number of individual transactions, so that over small enough time intervals 
we  would  observe  at  most  a  single  transaction.  Even  for  a  monetary  aggregate  that 
measures all transactions in an economy, in any given picosecond we are unlikely to 
observe more than a single trade, so  the discrete Poisson process, then, is one natural 
way to model the frequent observation of revenues.” In practice, however, it is often not 
practical or possible to observe at a high enough frequency to track every discrete event. 
Instead, what is observed over the relevant time period is an aggregate of many events, 
and  under  standard  conditions  this  aggregate  converges  to  a  diffusion  as  the  period 
between  events  and  their  size  both  become  small  at  a  particular  relative  rate.    The 
continuous-time limit we compute here thus corresponds to the iterated limit where the 
observation period of the players, though short, is much longer than the period between 
events.
3 
Our goal is to illuminate some conceptual points about the relationship between 
discrete and continuous time repeated games, and not to present a general theory, so we 
specialize throughout the paper to a specific example of a repeated game between a single 
long-run  player  and  a  sequence  of  short-run  opponents.  In  this  setting,  the  best 
equilibrium  payoff  can  be  attained  by  a  “grim”  strategy  that  prescribes  the  efficient 
outcome so long as the public signal above a critical threshold.  Our first main result, 
                                                 
3 We examine more general ways of passing to the continuous time limit in a companion paper, Fudenberg 
and Levine [2007]; this lets us explore the sensitivity of results about the diffusion case to the amount of 
“information aggregation” within each period.   2 
Proposition 1, shows how the existence of efficient or non-trivial equilibria in the limit of 
time periods shrinking to zero can be determined by two properties of the limits of the 
probabilities  p  and  q   that  punishment  is  triggered  under  the  equilibrium  action  and 
defection, respectively. Specifically, the key variables are the limit of the signal-to-noise 
ratio ( )/ q p p − , which we denote by  ρ ,  and the limit  µ  of the rate at which deviation 
increases transitions to the punishment regime ( )/ q p µ τ = −  where  τ  is the length of 
the period. We show that there is a  non-trivial limit equilibrium if ρ  is sufficiently large 
and   0 µ > , and that there is an efficient equilibrium in the iterated limit where first τ  
and then r  go to 0 if ρ = ∞ and  0 µ > .  
Proposition  1  applies  for  arbitrary  specifications  of  how  the  signal  structure 
depends on the period length; the remainder of this paper considers the case where the 
signals comes from observing an underlying Poisson or diffusion process.  We find that 
the equilibrium set is larger (and so efficient outcomes are more likely to be supportable 
by equilibria) when the public signals correspond to the aggregation of a great many 
signals,  that  is,  in  the  diffusion  case,  and  that  efficiency  is  less  likely  with  Poisson 
signals. In addition, we find that when the signal is based on a diffusion what matters is 
the effect of the players’ actions on the variance, of the aggregate, as opposed to its mean: 
Efficiency is more likely when the “tempting” or “cheating” actions generate a higher 
variance. (Note that in a Poisson process (aggregated or not), the mean and variance are 
linked, so actions that increase the variance must increase the mean.) Our results show 
that the case where player’s actions control the drift but not the variance of a diffusion 
process, is a knife-edge, at least when the long-run player has only two actions, as the 
conclusions about the frequent-monitoring limit can change discontinuously if actions 
have even a small effect on the variance.
4  
Finally, we extend the result of Abreu, Milgrom and Pearce [1991] (AMP) who 
show that Poisson events that correspond to bad news, meaning increased likelihood of 
“cheating,” lead to more efficient outcomes that Poisson events that correspond to good 
news.    These  results  about  the  most  efficient  limit  equilibria  are  summarized  in  the 
following table: 
                                                 
4 If the long-run player controls more than two actions, there may be mixed deviations that generate the 
same limit variance as the efficient action does. The implications of this for the limits of discrete-time 
equilibria has not yet been worked out.   3 
 
  Poisson  Diffusion  Diffusion, constant variance  
Bad News  Non-trivial  Efficient  Trivial 
Good News  Trivial  Non-trivial  Trivial 
 
Table 1: Most Efficient Limit Equilibrium Under Various Signal Structures 
 
Because  discrete-time  games  are  simpler  and  more  familiar  than  games  in 
continuous time, our analysis helps provide intuition for existing results on continuous-
time repeated games. In particular, we can use elementary calculus (l’Hopital’s rule) to 
show why diffusion signals with constant variance are relatively ineffective in supporting 
repeated play. Our methods also facilitate the analysis of diffusions where actions do 
change the variance of the signals. 
To set the stage for the issues we will address in this paper, a brief review will be 
useful.  Under  some  identification  conditions,  Fudenberg,  Levine  and  Maskin  [1994]  
(FLM) provide a folk theorem for the case of all long-run players, showing that any 
individually rational payoff vector can be approximated by an equilibrium payoff if the 
common discount factor of the players is sufficiently close to 1. More precisely, let  ( ) E δ  
be  the  set  of  perfect  public  equilibrium  payoffs  for  a  fixed  δ,  and  let 
1 (1) lim ( ) E E δ δ → = ; on the conditions of the FLM theorem, a payoff vector v is feasible 
and individually rational if and only if it is in  (1) E . It is important to recall that  the 
identification  conditions  used  for  this  theorem  are  purely  qualitative;  when  they  are 
satisfied, the set  (1) E  is independent of the exact nature of the distribution of signals and 
in particular of any quantitative measure of their “informativeness.” FLM also explain 
why the highest equilibrium payoff in symmetric strategies can be bounded away from 
efficiency when there are equilibrium payoffs that are symmetric and almost efficient.
5 
Sannikov [2005] characterizes the equilibrium payoffs in a repeated game with 
two long-run players in continuous time, where players control the mean of a vector-
valued diffusion process; he shows that this set is not degenerate but that for a fixed 
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[2006] for a characterization of  (1) E  without this condition.   4 
interest rate r  it can be bounded away from full efficiency, in contrast to the FLM result. 
Under  a  somewhat  stronger  identification  decision  (what  FLM  called  a  “product 
structure”), he proves a folk theorem for the limit  0 r → .  
For the case of games with both long-run and short-run players, Fudenberg and 
Levine [1994] provide a linear programming algorithm for computing the limit of the 
equilibrium payoffs as the discount factor of the long-run players converges to 1, and use 
this to prove a characterization of the limit payoffs in games with a product structure.  
This limit set is typically smaller than if all players were long run, and in particular the 
highest equilibrium payoff of a long-run player is bounded away from what it would be if 
all players were long run.
6 However, the limit set typically does include payoff vectors 
that cannot be generated by static equilibria. For  this  reason  it  is  striking  to  note  that 
Faingold and Sannikov [2005] show that the set of equilibria in a repeated game with one 
LR player facing SR opponents in continuous time when the public information is a 
diffusion process is simply the static equilibria, irregardless of the interest rate, so that the 
Fudenberg-Levine characterization fails. Thus changing the standard model by assuming 
both  short  run  players  and  a  diffusion  process  makes  a  more  significant  qualitative 
difference than either change on its own; this is one of the findings we can explain with 
our discrete-time methodology. 
  A second existing result that we explain is that the effect just described is specific 
to the diffusion process, and does not in general extend to the case of continuous time 
repeated games with Poisson signals. AMP investigate how the set of equilibrium payoffs 
varies with period length in a two-action partnership game with two long-run players, 
where  what  is  observed  in  each  time  period  is  the  number  of  Poisson-distributed 
“signals” that have arrived in the period. They restrict attention to symmetric equilibria, 
and determine the limit of the highest symmetric equilibrium payoff as the time period 
shrinks to 0; whether this limit is   degenerate (that is, includes only the static equilibrium 
payoff) or not depends on the relationship between the parameters of the payoff matrix 
and the informativeness of the signals. Our setting of a repeated game between a long-run 
player and a sequence of short-run opponents is essentially equivalent to their model, as 
in  each  case  there  is  no  way  to  “efficiently  punish”  one  player  by  simultaneously 
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perfectly observed actions.   5 
rewarding  his  opponent,  and  the  only  way  to  provide  incentives  is  to  lower  the 
equilibrium payoff after some of the signals, and the size of  (1) E  thus depends on the 
probability that punishment is triggered.
7   
This  probability  of  punishment  is  endogenously  determined  as  part  of  the 
equilibrium, but to characterize the most efficient equilibrium what matters is how small 
the probability can be made without giving a player an incentive to deviate. In the simple 
game we study, this minimum probability depends on a particular likelihood ratio that we 
identify. In the case of sampling from a fixed-intensity Poisson process, this likelihood 
ratio is constant as the time period shrinks, when it is sufficiently large, the equilibrium 
set is non-degenerate in the continuous-time limit, just as in AMP. In contrast, the key 
likelihood ratio converges to 0 when the signals correspond to sampling the diffusion 
process studied by Faingold and Sannikov, which provides a discrete-time explanation of 
their equilibrium degeneracy result.  
In games with all long-run players, the identification conditions imply that there 
are equilibria where incentives can be provided at negligible efficiency cost by efficient 
punishments; this is what FLM call  “enforcement on tangent hyperplanes.” Because the 
punishments can be efficient (i.e. tangential) their probability does not influence  (1) E . 
This  is  related  to  Sannikov’s  [2005]  result  that  diffusion  signals  that  satisfy  an 
identification condition do allow non-trivial equilibria in games with all long-run players.  
In  each  case  (both  discount  factors  going  to  1  and  time  periods  shrinking  to  0)  the 
equilibrium continuation payoffs vary only slightly with each observation, and moving 
along a tangent hyperplane means that the efficiency loss is second order.
8  
In  contemporaneous  work,  Sannikov  and  Skrzypacz  [2006]  provide  a  linear- 
programming characterization of the limit of the equilibria of repeated games with two 
long-run players in discrete time as the period length shrinks and the interest rate goes to 
0, where the public signal is derived by sampling an underlying continuous-time Levy 
process (a combination of a diffusion process and a Poisson process) whose parameters 
are  independent  of  the  sampling  length.  They  show,  loosely  speaking,  that  near  the 
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8 The diffusion case is more complicated because second-order terms are not negligible, so that the variance 
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boundary of the equilibrium set only the Poisson process can be used to provide non-
tangential incentives, while both sorts of processes can be used to provide incentives on 
tangent hyperplanes.  Our analysis differs in allowing the underlying process to vary with 
the sampling length, and in considering diffusions whose variance is influenced by the 
players’ actions. Of course our analysis also differs in considering an example of games 
with  a  short-run  player  (so  enforcement  on  tangent  hyperplanes  is  not  possible)  as 
opposed to their treatment of  games with two long-run players. 
We should also acknowledge Hellwig and Schmidt’s [2002] study of the limits of 
discrete-time principal-agent games as the time period shrinks. Instead of assuming that 
the discrete-time games correspond to sampling a diffusion process at discrete intervals, 
Hellwig and Schmidt suppose that the discrete-time games have a multinomial signal 
structure  that  converges  to  a  diffusion  as  the  time  period  shrinks,  and  compare  the 
resulting limits to Holmstrom and Milgrom’s analysis of the corresponding continuous-
time game,. Thus their work resembles our companion paper more than it does this one.       
2. The Repeated Commitment Game 
We consider repeated play of the two-person two-action stage game with payoff matrix 
 
  Player 2 
  L  R 
+1  u,0  u ,1 
 
Player 1 
-1  u,0  u g + ,-1 
 
          Table 2: Stage-Game Payoffs 
 
where u u <  and  0 g > . In the stage game, player 2 plays L in every Nash equilibrium, 
so player 1’s static Nash equilibrium payoff is  u, which is also the minmax payoff for 
player 1. Naturally player 1 would prefer that player 2 play R, but he can only induce 
player 2 to play R by avoiding playing –1. 
  At the end of each play of the stage game, players observe a public signal z ∈ ￿ 
that depends only on the action taken by player 1; player 2’s action is publicly observed,   7 
as is the outcome of a public randomizing device.
9  The probability distribution of the 
public  signal  is  1 ( | ) F z a .  We  assume  that  F   is  either  differentiable  and  strictly 
increasing,  or  that  it  corresponds  to  a  discrete  random  variable.  (When  F   is  strictly 
increasing we endow the real line with the Lebesgue sigma-algebra and suppose that 
strategies  are  Lebesgue  measurable.)    In  either  case,  let  1 ( | ) f z a   denote  the  density 
function.  We  assume  the  monotone  likelihood  ratio  condition  that 
1 1 ( | 1)/ ( | 1) f z a f z a = − = +   is  strictly  increasing  in  z .  This  says  that  z   is  “bad 
news” about player 1’s behavior in the sense that large z  means that player was probably 
playing –1, a reputation player 1 would like to avoid if he is to keep player 2 in the 
game.
10 We assume also the availability of a public randomization device; the outcome of 
this device is observed at the start of each period, before actions are taken. 
Let  τ  denote the length of the period. We suppose that player 1 is a long-run 
player  with  discount  factor  exp( ) r δ τ = −   facing  an  infinite  series  of  short-run 
opponents. We restrict attention to the set of perfect public equilibria, or PPE: these are 
strategy profiles for the repeated game in which (a) each player’s strategy depends only 
on the public information, and (b) no player wants to deviate at any public history.
11 The 
most favorable perfect public equilibrium for LR is characterized
12 by the largest value v  
that satisfies the constraints 
(C) 
1
1
(1 ) ( ) ( | 1)
(1 )( ) ( ) ( | 1)
( )
v u w z f z a dz
v u g w z f z a dz
v w z u
δ δ
δ δ
= − + = +
≥ − + + = −
≥ ≥
∫
∫  
                                                 
9 Technically speaking the public information also includes the short-run player’s action, but  since public 
randomizations are available  we can restrict attention to strategies that ignore the past actions of the short-
run player, and obtain the same set of outcomes of  perfect public equilibria. To see this, observe that 
continuation  payoffs  can  always  be  arranged  by  a  public  randomization  between  the  best  and  worst 
equilibrium. If continuation payoffs depend on the play of the short-run player, the long-run player cares 
only about the expected value conditional on the signal of his own play. Since that expected value lies 
between the best and worst equilibrium, there is an equivalent equilibrium in which the continuation value 
is constant and equal to the conditional expected value. 
10 Because player 1 has only two actions, this assumption is without loss of generality, as we can always re-
order the signals so that it is satisfied. 
11  See  Fudenberg  and  Tirole  [1991]  for  a  definition  of  this  concept  and  an  example  of  a  non-public 
equilibrium in a game with public monitoring. 
12 The arguments of Fudenberg and Levine [1983] or Abreu, Pearce and Stachetti [1990] can be adapted  to 
show that the set of PPE payoffs here is compact,  so the best equilibrium payoff is well-defined.   8 
or v u =  if no solution exists. Notice that this formulation is possible only because the 
existence of a public randomizing device implies that any payoff  ( ) w z  between v  and u 
can  be  attained  by  randomizing  between  the  two  equilibria.  Note  that  the  second 
incentive  constraint  must  hold  with  equality,  since  otherwise  it  would  be  possible  to 
increase  the  punishment payoff  w   while  maintaining  incentive  compatibility,  and  by 
doing so increase utility on the equilibrium path. This is a simple extension to the case of 
a continuous signal of the result proven in Fudenberg and Levine [1994]. 
  Because of the monotone likelihood ratio condition, equilibria that give the long-
run  player  the  maximum  utility  have  a  cut-point  property,  with  fixed  punishment 
occurring if the signal exceeds a threshold * z . In the case of a variable z  with a positive 
density  this  condition  is quite  straightforward;  Levin  [2003]  and  Sannikov-Skrzypacz 
[2005]  prove  the  analogous  result  for  games  with  two  long-run  players.  When  the 
distribution of  z  has atoms, the argument is complicated by the fact that the threshold 
itself will typically be realized with positive probability. For this reason it is useful for a 
given threshold  * z ∈ ℜ to use public randomization to define a random variable  * z ￿  that 
in the continuous case is equal to  * z  and in the discrete case picks the two grid points 
* * z z <  just below and above  * z , with probability  ( * *)/( * *) z z z z − −  of picking 
* z .    After  the  signal  z  is  observed,  and  before  play  in  the  next  period,  the  public 
randomizing device is used to determine whether z is compared to cutoff  * z  or cutoff 
* z . 
Lemma 1: A solution to the LP problem characterizing the most favorable perfect public 
equilibrium for the long-run player with the continuation payoffs  ( ) w z  is given by 
 
*
( )
*
u z z
w z
v z z
 ≥   =   <  
￿
￿
. 
  
Proof: Let  ( ) w z  be a solution to the LP problem, and let  
  1 ( ) ( | 1) W w z f z a dz = = − ∫  
Clearly  ( ) w z  must also solve the problem of maximizing    9 
  1 ( ) ( | 1) w z f z a dz = + ∫  
subject to 
 
1 ( ) ( | 1)
( )
w z f z a dz W
v w z u
= − ≤
≥ ≥
∫  
Ignoring  for  a  moment  the  second  set  of  constraints,  and  letting  ν   be  the  Lagrange 
multiplier on the first constraint, the derivative of the Lagrangean is 
  1 1 ( )[ ( | 1) ( | 1)] w z f z a f z a dz ν = + − = − ∫ . 
By the monotone likelihood ratio condition, there is a  * z  such that  
 
1
1
( | 1)
 or < 
( | 1)
f z a
f z a
ν
= +
>
= −
 
as  *, * z z z z < > ,  and  in  the  continuous  case  there  is  a  unique  * z   for  which  the 
condition holds with equality. 
  This now shows that for  * z z <  we must have  ( ) w z v =  and for  * z z >  we 
must have  ( ) w z u = . That leaves the case  * z z =  when z  is discrete. Since in that case 
( *) u w z v ≤ ≤  can be realized by a public randomization between  , u v , we may use the 
* z ￿  construction for some appropriately chosen  * z . 
￿ 
 
In the continuous case, we can now define 
  1 1
* *
( | 1) , ( | 1)
z z
p f z a dz q f z a dz
∞ ∞
= = + = = − ∫ ∫  
to be the probability of punishment conditional on each of the two actions. In the discrete 
case,  we  can  make  a  similar  definition,  taking  account  of  the  public  randomization 
implicit in  * z ￿ .  
Consider,  then,  the  LP  problem  of  maximizing  v   subject  to  the  simplified 
constraints   10 
(C' ) 
(1 ) ( ( ))
(1 )( ) ( ( ))
0 , 1
v u v p v w
v u g v q v w
u w v
p q
δ δ
δ δ
= − + − −
= − + + − −
≤ ≤
≤ ≤
 
Let the solution to this be  * v  or  * v u =  if no solution exists.
13 Choosing the 
cutoff point  * z  which leads to the largest solution of this optimization problem then 
characterizes the most favorable perfect public equilibrium for the long-run player; we 
know also that in this optimal solution w u = . Manipulating the first two lines of system 
(C' ) shows that (1 ) ( )( ) g q p v w δ δ − = − − , and plugging this into the first line of (C' )  
shows that if a solution exists, its value is   
 
pg
v u
q p
= −
−
.   
So we conclude that the highest equilibrium payoff is  
 
(1)  * max{ , }
pg
v u u
q p
= −
−
. 
Note that this converges to the first best as /( ) 0 p q p − → . It remains to determine when 
a solution to C'  exists. Substitution into the equation for w  shows that  
 
 
(1 ) pg g
w u
q p q p
δ
δ
−
= − −
− −
. 
This payoff is feasible if it is at least u , which is equivalent to  
 
(2) 
( )( ) (1 )
1
u u q p
g p p
δ
δ
− − −
− ≥ . 
Moreover, because  1 δ < , when (2) is satisfied, we have  
 
( )( )
1
u u q p
g p
− −
> ,  
which implies that 
                                                 
13 Here we use the fact that the incentive constraint is binding at the optimum, this is why the second line is 
an equality and not an inequality.   11 
  * pg
v u u
q p
= − >
−
. 
This proves the following result: 
Corollary 2: For a fixed discount factor  δ, there is an equilibrium with the long-run 
player’s payoff above u if and only if there are  , [0,1] p q ∈  that satisfy (2). If such ( , ) p q  
exist for a given δ, they exist for all  ' δ δ > . 
Inspecting (1) and (2) shows that the highest equilibrium payoff is obtained by 
choosing  * z  to maximize the “signal to noise” ratio  
 
q p
p
−
  
subject to the constraint that (2) is satisfied. In games with a finite set of signals, the 
likelihood  ratio  is  obviously  finite  for  any  cut-off  such  that  0 p > ,  so  the  best 
equilibrium payoff is bounded away from the first best irrespective of  δ. This need not 
be the case when the set of signals is infinite. Indeed, as noted by Mirrlees [1974], this 
likelihood ratio can become infinite when the signals are normally distributed with a 
fixed variance and mean that depends on action. In the static principal-agent problem 
Mirrlees considered, the set of transfers was unbounded, so the fact that the signal to 
noise  ratio  can  be  made  arbitrarily  large  implied  that  the  first-best  outcome  can  be 
approximated arbitrarily closely. In our setting, in contrast, because of the bound on the 
continuation payoffs, the first best can not be approximated arbitrarily closely for any 
fixed  1 δ < , but it can be approximated in the limit as  1 δ → . Intuitively, as  1 δ → , the 
bounds on continuation payoffs become unimportant, because even a small change in 
continuation payoff outweighs any one period  gain.  We say more about the case of 
unbounded signal to noise ratios and the normal distribution in section 4.  
3: Sending the Time Interval to Zero 
  Our interest is in how the set of PPE payoffs varies with the period length, and in 
particular its behavior as the time period shrinks to zero, because we want to relate this 
limit  to  the  predictions  of  various  continuous-time  models.  To  facilitate  taking  the 
continuous-time limit, we substitute  r e τ −  into (2) and rearrange terms, to obtain  
   12 
(3) 
1 ( )( ) r e q p u u p
g
τ
τ τ τ
− − −
≤ − . 
Let  p and q  be functions of  τ  such that  ( ) p τ  and  ( ) q τ  satisfy (3) for each  τ ; we say 
that  p  and  q   are  regular  if  the  limits  0 lim ( ( ) ( ))/ ( ) q p p τ ρ τ τ τ → = −   and 
0 lim ( ( ) ( ))/ q p τ µ τ τ τ → = −  exist. The first limit ρ can be thought of as the limit of the 
signal  to  noise  ratio,  since  q p −   is  a  measure  of  how  different  the  distribution  of 
outcomes  is  under  the  two  different  actions,  and  p  is  a  measure  of  how  often  the 
“punishment” signal arrives when in fact the long-run player has been well-behaved. The 
second limit  µ  is a measure of the difference between the bad news signal arrival rate 
over the good news rate. When p and q are regular, the limit of the right-hand-side of (3) 
exists, resulting in the limit inequality  
 
(4)  ( ) ( / ) (( )/ ) 1 r u u g µ ρ ρ ≤ − −   
and moreover  
(5)  0 0
( )
lim * lim
( ) ( )
gp g
v u u
q p
τ τ
τ
τ τ ρ
→ → = − = −
−
.  
      Now fix regular functions( , ) p q . If there exists positive  ,r τ  and  ε such that 
for all non-negative smaller values  0 ,0 r r τ τ < < < <  the game with period length 
τ  and interest rate  r  has an equilibrium with punishment probabilities  ( ) p τ  and  ( ) q τ  
with payoff at least u ε + , we say ( , ) p q  supports a non-trivial limit equilibrium. If for 
all ( , ) (0,0) r τ →  there are equilibria with punishment probabilities  ( ) p τ  and  ( ) q τ  that 
have  payoffs  converging  to  u ,  we  say  that  ( , ) p q supports  an  efficient  patient 
equilibrium. We say that there is a non-trivial or efficient limit if there is a regular ( , ) p q  
that supports it.  
  Note that the definition of a non-trivial limit equilibrium requires the payoff in 
question to be supportable as an equilibrium when the interest rate r is held fixed as the 
period length τ  goes to 0.  The definition of an efficient patient equilibrium requires the 
interest rate to go to 0 as well. However the efficient payoff must be attained in the limit 
regardless of the relative rates at which τ  and r  converge, so that in particular efficiency 
must be obtained if we first send τ  to 0 with r  fixed and only then decrease r . The other   13 
order  of  limits,  with  r   becoming  small  for  fixed  τ ,  corresponds  to  the  usual  folk-
theorem analysis in discrete-time games. 
Proposition 1: Regular ( , ) p q  support a non-trivial limit equilibrium if  /( ) g u u ρ > −  
and  0 µ > ; it supports an efficient limit equilibrium if ρ = ∞ and  0 µ > . Conversely, 
there is a non-trivial limit equilibrium only if there is a ( , ) p q with  /( ) g u u ρ > −  and 
0 µ > , and there is an efficient patient equilibrium only if there is a regular ( , ) p q  with 
ρ = ∞ and  0 µ > . 
Proof: If  /( ) g u u ρ > −  and  0 µ > , then the right hand side of (4) is strictly positive, 
so we can find  0 r >  such that (4) is satisfied for all sufficiently small τ  and all r r < .  
If  ρ = ∞  and  0 µ > ,  then  (4)  is  positive  for  small  r,  and  moreover  from  (5)  the 
corresponding limit payoff is efficient.  
  Conversely, if( , ) p q  is regular and either  /( ) g u u ρ ≤ −  or  0 µ = , the right-
hand side of (4) is non-positive, and so for any fixed positive r (4) must be violated for τ  
sufficiently small, so there cannot be an equilibrium with payoffs above  u . Finally, if 
0 µ >  and ρ < ∞ then from (5) the limit payoff cannot be efficient,  * v u >  and (3) is 
satisfied for  τ  sufficiently large. From (1)  * v u > , and then (3) is positive if  0 µ > . 
Moreover, from (2)  * v u =  if and only if ρ = ∞. 
￿ 
 
The proof of Proposition 1 does not use the fact that the optimal equilibrium has 
continuation payoff u  after bad signals: For the existence of non-trivial limit equilibria, it 
is necessary and sufficient that  /( ) g u u ρ > −  and  0 µ >  for some family of cut-point 
equilibria. Of course the conditions are also necessary and sufficient for limits of families 
of optimal equilibria. Note that Proposition 1’s sufficient condition for a non-trivial limit 
equilibrium is an extension of Proposition 2 of AMP, which applies only to the case of 
sampling from a fixed Poisson distribution that we study in the next section.
14. 
Restricting to these equilibria gives a useful lemma that makes it easier to check 
the conditions of Proposition 1. 
 
                                                 
14 Their result covers only pure strategy equilibria, and has no condition on µ , which is implicitly assumed 
to be positive.   14 
Lemma  3:  Suppose  that  the  interest  rate  ( ) r τ   depends  on  the  period  length.  If 
( ( ), ( )) p q τ τ   are  optimal  non-trivial  equilibria  for  ( , ( )) r τ τ   and 
0 lim ( ( ) ( ))/ ( ) q p p τ ρ τ τ τ → = − ,  0 lim ( ( ) ( ))/ q p τ µ τ τ τ → = − ,  0 lim ( ) r r τ τ → =   and 
* * lim ( ) v v τ =  exist, then  * * / ( )/( ) r u v v u µ ρ = − − . 
Proof: Substituting w u =  into the equation for the equilibrium payoff in the first line of 
' C  we have 
  [ ] *( ) (1 ) *( ) ( )( *( ) ) v u v p v u τ δ δ τ τ τ = − + − − . 
This may be rearranged as 
 
( ) (1 ) *( )
*( )
r
r
p e u v
e v u
τ
τ
τ τ
τ τ τ
−
−
− −
=
−
. 
We can rewrite  
 
( )
( )
( ) ( ) /
( )/
( ) ( ) / ( )
q p
p
q p p
τ τ τ
τ τ
τ τ τ
−
=
−
 , 
so  
( )
( )
( ) ( ) / (1 ) *( )
( ) ( ) / ( ) *( )
r
r
q p e u v
q p p e v u
τ
τ
τ τ τ τ
τ τ τ τ τ
−
−
− − −
=
− −
 
and taking the limit  0 τ →  gives the desired result. 
￿ 
 
Because a non-trivial limit equilibrium requires that the limit payoff exceeds u , lemma 1 
implies that  0 / lim ( )/ p τ µ ρ τ τ → =  must be finite, a fact we use below. Intuitively, if 
the  optimal  equilibria  were  to  have  0 lim ( )/ p τ τ τ → = ∞,  when  τ   is  small  the 
probability of quickly reaching the punishment phase with a continuation payoff of u is 
close to one. That implies that the equilibrium payoff is close to u .   
In  applying  Proposition  1  to  a  family  of  optimal  equilibria  ( ( ), ( )) p q τ τ  
corresponding to the game with period length and interest rate ( , ( )) r τ τ , it is possible that 
this family is not regular. In this case, we can restrict attention to a sequence of optimal 
equilibria  that  are  regular,  that  is,  along  a  subsequence  n τ   for  which  
0 lim ( ( ) ( ))/ ( ) n n n n q p p τ τ τ τ → −   and  0 lim ( ( ) ( ))/ n n n n q p τ τ τ τ → −   do  converge.  For   15 
notational  simplicity  we  have  stated  our  results  for  the  case  in  which  the  optimal  
equilibria are regular, but they apply equally well to subsequences that are regular.  
4. Fixed-Intensity Poisson Signals  
In this section we suppose that the public signal of the long-run player’s action is 
generated by observing a Poisson process in continuous time. The players simultaneously 
observe the result of this process every  τ  units of time, and the process is held fixed as 
the time period becomes small. This means that the probability of two or more events in a 
time interval is second order in τ .  
The arrival rate of the Poisson process is  p λ  if the action taken by LR is +1 and 
q λ  if the action taken by LR is  –1. As in Abreu, Milgrom and Pearce’s [1991] analysis 
of a partnership game with two long-run players, a critical role is played by whether the 
Poisson  event  is  good  news  –  meaning  that  the  long-run  player  probably  played  the 
commitment action +1, or bad news, meaning he probably deviated to –1. If  q p λ λ >  the 
event is “bad news.”  In this case we take random variable  z  to be the non-negative 
discrete  random  variable  representing  the  number  of  events  that  occurred  during  the 
previous interval of length τ . If  q p λ λ <  the event is “good news.” In this case we take 
the random variable  z  to be the non-positive discrete random variable representing the 
negative of the number of events received during the previous interval of length  τ . In 
this way we preserve the convention that high z  is bad news. As in Abreu, Milgrom and 
Pearce [1991], we will show that we get a non-trivial limit equilibrium in the bad news 
case, but not in the good news case.  
To begin we analyze the case of bad-news events  q p λ λ > .  The cutoff point is 
how many events must occur before the punishment  v w −  is triggered. If we take the 
cutoff to be two or more events, then the probability of triggering punishment is of order 
2 τ ; this implies that  0 lim ( ( ) ( ))/ q p τ µ τ τ τ → = −  is equal to 0, which from lemma 1 
rules out a non-trivial limit equilibrium.  
So  the  only  interesting  cutoff  is  to  punish  whenever  any  event  is  received. 
Consider the suboptimal rule in which punishment occurs with probability  α when one 
or more events occur, independent of the period length. The probability of one or more 
events is  ( ) 1 , or  ( ) 1
p q p e q e
λ τ λ τ τ τ
− − = − = − , as the long-run player plays –1 or +1. 
We  may  then  directly  compute   16 
( )/ ( )/   and  q p p q p p q p ρ α λ λ αλ λ λ λ µ λ λ = − = − = − . Hence the condition for a 
non-trivial  limit  equilibrium  is  ( )/   /( ) q p p g u u ρ λ λ λ = − > − ,  and  the  best  limit 
equilibrium payoff is  * /( ) p q p v u gλ λ λ = − − , as shown by Proposition 2 of APM.
15 
The significant feature of this solution is that it is independent of the payoff u.  
  Now we analyze the case of “good news” events  q p λ λ < . Here the punishment 
is triggered by a small number of events, rather than a large number. If there is to be any 
punishment at all, then punishment must certainly occur when no event occurs. Suppose 
the  probability  of  punishment  when  there  is  no  event  is  ( ) γ τ .  Then 
( ) ( ) , ( ) ( )
p q p e q e
λ τ λ τ τ γ τ τ γ τ
− − = = . Regardless of  ( ) γ τ  this implies  0 ρ = . 
As we observed in the introduction, the fact that one player is short run means that 
providing incentives to the long-run player has a non-trivial efficiency cost. In the case of 
“good news” events, providing incentives requires frequent punishment, but if there are  
many independent and non-trivial chances of  a non-trivial punishment in a small interval 
of real time, the long run player’s present value must be so low that it is impossible to 
improve on the static equilibrium.  In contrast, there can be non-trivial equilibrium even 
in the limit when the signal used for punishment has negligible probability (as in the case 
of bad-news events) or if there are several long run players so that punishments can take 
the form of efficient transfers. 
5. Diffusion Signals With Common Variance 
Faingold and Sannikov [2005] study the case where signals about the action of the 
long-run player are generated by a diffusion process in continuous time, with the drift in 
the process controlled by the long-run player’s action.  In this section, we suppose that 
the players observe the underlying process at intervals of length  τ , as in Sannikov and 
Skryzpacz [2005], who study repeated games with two long run players.
16  To do this, we 
apply Proposition 3, and consider a slight generalization of the diffusion assumption: we 
                                                 
15 Because the probability of having more than a single event vanishes at rate  2 τ , the limit equilibrium 
payoff  * /( ) p q p v u gλ λ λ = − −  computed from this sub-optimal rule is the same as the payoff computed 
assuming certain punishment whenever there are two or more events.  We could also allow α  to depend on 
the period length without changing our conclusions. 
16 Thus our approach differs from that of Hellwig and Schmidt [2002], which constructs the limit diffusion 
process and limit continuous time game as the limit of discrete-time games with multinomial signals, and 
the signal process and payoff functions are rescaled in the appropriate way as  0 τ → .    17 
allow  the  variance  of  the  signal  z   to  be  given  by  2 2α σ τ   where  1 α < ,  so  that  the 
diffusion case corresponds to  1/2 α = . The mean of the process is   1 a τ −  (recall that 
1 a =+1 or –1).   
Observe that if Φ  is the standard normal cumulative distribution, then  
 
*
*
z
p
z
q
α
α
τ
στ
τ
στ
− −     = Φ     
− +     = Φ     
 
We show below that there is no sequence of  cutoffs that supports a non-trivial limit 
equilibrium. Before doing so, we examine a simpler result that that provides intuition for 
the general one – it is not possible to support a non-trivial limit when the probability p of 
punishment along the equilibrium path is held fixed as  0 τ → . 
Let  *( ) z τ   denote  the  cutoff  when  the  period  length  is  τ ,  and  define  the 
normalized cutoff  
 
*( )
( )
z
α
τ τ
ζ τ
στ
+
=  
Then  
( )
1
( )
2
( )
p
q
α
ζ τ
τ
ζ τ
σ
−
= Φ −
    = Φ −      
. 
If p is held fixed, then  1( ) p ζ − = −Φ  is fixed as well, and   
  ( ) ( )
1
0 0
2
lim ( )/ lim ) / ) 0 q p p
α
τ τ
τ
ρ ζ ζ ζ
σ
−
→ →
        = − = Φ − −Φ − Φ − =            
.  
From Proposition 1, this sequence cannot support a non-trivial limit equilibrium. 
Of course this does not show that there are not non-trivial limits for all sequences 
of  cut-offs,  In  particular,  it  is  always  possible  to  find  a  series  of  cut-offs  such  that 
ρ = ∞, by sending the normalized cutoff to  ∞. However, in contrast to the principal-
agent  problem  considered  by  Mirrlees,  rewards  and  punishments  in  our  model  are 
bounded, so ρ = ∞ is not sufficient for a non-trivial limit equilibrium;  we also need to 
ensure that  0 µ > , so that the increase in punishment caused by cheating vanishes no 
faster than the period length.  We will show that the combination of these two conditions   18 
is only possible if α is (at least) one; a similar result for the case  1/2 α =  can be found 
in Sannikov and Skrzypacz [2005].  
Proposition 2: For any  1 α < there is no non-trivial limit equilibrium.  
Proof:  We will show that for τ  sufficiently small, (3) is necessarily violated.
17 
 Let  *( ) z τ  denote the cutoff when the period length is τ . It is convenient to work with 
the normalized cutoff   ( ) ζ τ  defined above. From Proposition 2, if there is to be a non-
trivial  limit  equilibrium,  we  must  have  0 lim ( ( ) ( ))/ ( ) 0 n n n n q p p τ ρ τ τ τ → = − >   and 
0 µ > , and this second inequality requires that ( )/ q p τ −  is bounded away from zero. 
We will show that this implies that  / lim ( )/ p µ ρ τ τ = = ∞, which contradicts Lemma 
1.   
   Let    ' φ = Φ   denotes  the  density  of  the  standard  normal.  First  we  compute 
( )/ q p τ −  using the mean value theorem to observe that for each  τ  there is a number 
( ) f τ , 0 ( ) 1 f τ ≤ ≤ , such that 
 
( )
1
1
2
( ) ( ( )) /
2 2
( ) ( )
q p
f
α
α
α
τ
ζ τ ζ τ τ
τ σ
τ
φ ζ τ τ
στ σ
−
−
    −     = Φ − −Φ −            
    = − +      
 
Let  ( ) ( )/ c q p τ τ = − . We can invert this relationship to find 
 
1
2 1
2 1
1
2
( ) ( ) ( ) /2
1 1 2
exp( ( ) ( ) ) ( ) /2
2 2
2
( ) ( ) 2log( 2 ( ) /2) 2 log( )
2
( ) 2log( 2 ( ) /2) 2 log( ) ( )
f c
f c
f c
c f
α
α
α
α
α
α
τ
φ ζ τ τ τ στ
σ
τ
ζ τ τ τ στ
σ π
τ
ζ τ τ π τ σ α τ
σ
τ
ζ τ π τ σ α τ τ
σ
−
−
−
−
   − + =      
    − − + =      
   − + = − −      
= − − +
 
We now want to use this to show that  / p τ → ∞. Since we have assumed that  ( ) c τ  is 
bounded  away  from  zero,  1 ( ) log 2 log b a α ζ τ α τ τ − ≤ − − + .  This  gives 
                                                 
17 Note the difference with the result of Muller [2000], who observes that the principal can implement the 
first best in a discrete-time repeated moral hazard problem with diffusion signals. The difference stems 
from the fact that Muller allows unbounded rewards, while the feasible payoffs here are bounded above and 
below.   19 
1 / ( log 2 log )/ p b a α τ α τ τ τ − ≥ Φ − − − − .  We now apply the mean value theorem to 
the function  
1 ( ) ( log 2 log )/ g b a
α τ α τ τ τ
− = Φ − − − − , where we define  (0) 0 g = .
18 
Again using the mean value theorem we know that for some  ' [0, ] τ τ ∈ , we have 
 
( )
1
1
1 2 2 2
1/2
( log 2 log )/
(1 )( ') ( log 2 log ' ( ') )
' log 2 log '
1
(1 )( ')
2 ' log 2 log '
exp( 1/2) log 2 log ' 2 ( ') log 2 log ' ( ')
2 '
b a
a b a
b
a
b
b a b a
b
α
α α
α
α α
α τ τ τ
α
α τ φ α τ τ
τ α τ
α
α τ
π τ α τ
α τ τ α τ τ
α
π τ
−
− −
−
− −
Φ − − − −
    = − − − − − −       − −
    = − −       − −
× − − − + − − +
=
( )
( )
1 2 2 2
1/2 1
1 2 2 2
(1 )( ')
log 2 log '
( ') exp( ( ') log 2 log 'exp( 1/2) ( ')
( ')
(1 )
2 log 2 log '
(exp( ( ') log 2 log 'exp( 1/2) ( ') .
a
b
a b a
b
a
b
a b a
α
α α α
α
α α
α τ
α τ
τ τ α τ τ
α τ
α
π α τ
τ α τ τ
−
− −
−
− −
    − −       − −
× − − − −
    = − −     − −  
× − − − −
 
Denote the expression in the last step of this series of equalities by  ( ') J τ ; this has the 
form 
1
( ( ') )exp ( ')
( ')
k x y
x
τ γ τ
τ
  −   −      
, where  
1 '
( ')
log 2 log '
x
b
α τ
τ
α τ
−
=
− −
,  (1 ) a γ α = − , 
and  ( )
2 2 2 ( ') exp( 1/2) ( ') 1 y a
α τ τ
− = − → .  As  ' 0 τ → ,  log( ') τ − diverges to infinity more 
slowly than any fixed negative power of  ' τ  so  ( ') x τ → ∞ , so  ( ') J τ →∞ and thus 
/ p τ → ∞ 
￿ 
  Notice that in the limit for  1 α <  the equilibrium collapses to the static Nash; in 
particular  this  is  true  even  when  1/2 α > ,  so  that  the  process  converges  to  a 
deterministic  one.  By  way  of  contrast,  the  “bad  news”  Poisson  case,  which  like  the 
diffusion case corresponds to  1/2 α = , does not collapse in the limit. This shows that 
the exact form of the noise matters: is it a series of unlikely negative events, as in the 
“bad news” Poisson case, or a sum of small increments as in the normal case? 
                                                 
18  We can apply the mean value theorem here because  g is continuous on the closed interval  [0, ] τ  and 
differentiable on its interior.   20 
  It is useful to contrast the diffusion case  1/2 α =  to the case  1 α = , where the 
mean and the standard error are both of order  τ .  When we take the limit of such a 
sequence of processes, the limit is a deterministic process without noise. 
Proposition 3:  If  1 α =  there is an efficient patient equilibrium.  
Proof:  From Proposition 1, it is enough to find functions  , p q  that satisfy (3) and such 
that ρ = ∞ and  0 µ > . As in the proof of Proposition 2, it is convenient to work with 
the normalized cutoff  
 
1 *( )/
( )
z τ τ
ζ τ
σ
+
= ,  
Then  
 
( )
( )
( )
2
( )
p
q
ζ τ
ζ τ
σ
= Φ −
= Φ −
. 
Observe  then  that  if  ( ) ζ τ → ∞  then  as  in  Mirrlees  [1974]  the  likelihood  ratio 
( )/ ( ) q p τ τ → ∞ implying that ρ = ∞. Moreover if we take  
  ( ) log(1/ ) ζ τ τ =  
then 
 
[ ]
2 ( )
2
log(1/ )
( ) ( )
lim
2 ( ( )) 2
lim lim
2
2 2
lim 0
2 2
q p
e
e
ζ τ
τ
τ τ
µ
τ
φ ζ τ
στ τ σ π
τ σ π σ π
−
−
−
−
=
−
≥ =
= = >
 
as required in Proposition 1. 
￿ 
 
6. Diffusion Signals with Unequal Variances  
In the previous section, we followed Faingold and Sannikov [2005] by assuming 
that the instantaneous variance of the diffusion process was independent of the action   21 
taken. We now look at the opposite case. We assume that the over an interval of length τ  
the signals have variance  2
1 σ τ +  or  2
1 σ τ −  as the action chosen is either  1 a =+1 or –1;  the 
means are still   1 µ τ +  and  1 µ τ − . With unequal variances, the monotone likelihood ratio 
condition necessarily fails. However, we will show below, that the optimum is to have 
two cutoff-points, rather than one. In other words, the relevant cutoff rules are of the form 
( ), ( ) z z τ τ , together with strategies that treat signals that are extreme  ( ), ( ) z z z z τ τ < >  
in one way, and signals that are intermediate  ( ) ( ) z z z τ τ ≤ ≤  the other way. 
In what follows, it will generally be useful to define the normalized cutoffs 
 
1
1/2
1
( )
( )
z τ µ τ
ζ τ
σ τ
+
+
−
=  and 
1
1/2
1
( )
( )
z τ µ τ
ζ τ
σ τ
+
+
−
=  
together with the regions  ( ), ( ) z ζ ζ τ ζ τ < >  and  ( ) ( ) ζ τ ζ ζ τ ≤ ≤ . This gives rise also 
to the inverse relations 
  1/2
1 1 ( ) ( ) z σ τ ζ τ µ τ τ + + + =  
  1/2
1 1 ( ) ( ) z σ τ ζ τ µ τ τ + + + = . 
  6a)  Extreme values are bad news:  1 1 σ σ − + > . 
We  will  show  that  in  this  case  there  is  an  efficient  patient  equilibrium.  Here 
punishment should occur whenever the realized value of the signal z is extreme. To prove 
that there is an efficient patient equilibrium, we do not need to compute the optimal 
cutoff rule; we simply need to find a cutoff rule that supports equilibrium payoffs that are 
arbitrarily close to efficiency. To do this we fix a positive number 
* ζ  and consider the 
cutoff rule  * * ( ) , ( ) ζ τ ζ ζ τ ζ = − = , which implies that  1/2 *
1 1 ( ) z τ σ τ ζ µ τ + + = − +  and 
1/2 *
1 1 ( ) z τ σ τ ζ µ τ + + = + . Note that this cutoff rule is symmetric around the mean of 
the +1 action, and that the normalized cut-offs are independent of τ . Then the probability 
of punishment under action +1 is  ( )
* * 2 p = Φ −ζ , and the probability of punishment 
under action -1 is    22 
 
1 1
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− −
    − −     = Φ + −Φ            
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1 * *
1
2 q
+
−
    Φ − ≡      
σ
ζ
σ
   
 
 
This  shows  that  the  effect  of  the  actions  on  the  means  has  vanishing  impact  on  the 
punishment  probability,  essentially  because  the  means  under  the  two  actions  are 
converging at rate τ  while the standard deviations only converge at rate  1/2 τ . 
Proposition 4: If  1 1 / 1 σ σ − + >  then  for any interest rate there are equilibria whose 
payoffs are arbitrarily close to efficiency. 
 
Proof: Set  
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=
        Φ −          
. 
Then  (0) 1 κ = , and using L’Hopital’s rule we have that 
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  −   =               −          
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0
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Hence by taking  * ζ  sufficiently large we can make  ( *) κ ζ  arbitrarily close to 0. 
With these trigger strategies, the payoffs converge to     23 
 
* *
* *
/
1 /
gp q
v u
p q
= −
−
. 
This is more than u  whenever  ( *) κ ζ  is sufficiently small, so (1) is satisfied; moreover it 
converges to u  as  0 κ → . 
  From Corollary 1, the other condition for equilibrium is    
  * * ( )
( ( )/ 1) 1 1 r u u
p q p e
g
τ τ
 −    − − > −      
. 
Observe that   ( )/ * q p τ  converges to  1/κ so for small enough  κ this inequality will 
hold for all sufficiently small τ .       
￿ 
6b) Extreme values are good news:  1 1 σ σ + − > . 
  In this case we have two results, one positive and one negative. We begin with the 
positive result, which is simpler, because we can prove it using the same cutoff rule we 
used above  ( ) *, ( ) * ζ τ ζ ζ τ ζ = − = . 
Proposition 5: For any fixed r  there is a  1 λ >  such that if  1 1 / σ σ λ + − >  there is a 
non-trivial limit equilibrium. Moreover, as  λ → ∞, the best limit payoff converges to 
the first best. 
Proof:  Set  ( )
1
g
v u
κ
κ
κ
= −
−
, and set 
u u
u u g
κ
−
=
− +
; note that  ( ) v u κ >  exactly 
when κ κ >  and that  0 lim ( ) v u κ κ → = .  Set  
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        − Φ −          
.   
Then  from l’Hopital’s rule  
 
1
1
(0) 1
σ
κ
σ
−
+
= <   
and κ is monotone increasing, with lim ( ) 1 ζ κ ζ →∞ = . Thus we can set  1/ λ κ =  , and 
whenever  1 1 / σ σ λ + − > ,  there will be a ζ  such that  ( ) κ ζ κ < . In this case we claim   24 
that there is an equilibrium with cutoff  ζ  and payoff  ( ( )) v κ ζ  for all  τ  less than some 
0 τ > . 
  To see this, note that with these strategies the payoff is  
 
( )
( ) ( )
G
G
p g
v u u
q p
ζ
ζ ζ
= − >
−
,  
so (1) is satisfied by construction. From Corollary 1, the other condition for equilibrium 
is    
 
( )
( ) 1 r u u
q p p e
g
τ −
− − > − . 
Because p and q are held fixed independent of τ , and the left-hand side of this inequality 
is positive, the inequality will hold for all sufficiently small τ . 
Finally, note that as  λ → ∞,  (0) 0 κ → , so sending   ζ  to 0 as  τ  goes to 0 
results in payoffs that converge to the first best.         
￿ 
For the next result we need to consider the optimal equilibria.  
Lemma 4: The optimal policy is determined by a number  ( ) B τ such that 
  ( ) ( ) 2 2 2 1/2
1 1 1 1 1 2 ( ) 0 B σ σ ζ µ µ σ τ ζ τ + − − + + − + − + =  
has two real roots  ( ) ( ) ζ τ ζ τ <  and the policy of punishing when  ( ) ( ) ζ τ ζ ζ τ ≤ ≤ . 
Proof: Recall from the proof of Lemma 1, prior to the use of the MLRP condition, that 
the optimal strategy must maximize the Lagrangean  
  1 1 ( )[ ( | 1) ( | 1)] w z f z a f z a dz ν = + − = − ∫ . 
In  other  words,  ( ) w z   must  be  minimized  (punishment)  when 
1 1 ( | 1) ( | 1) f z a f z a ν = + − = −   is  negative,  and  take  on  the  maximum  value of  v 
when this expression is positive. So the punishment region is bounded by critical values 
of z  where 
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Taking logs, this becomes the quadratic 
 
1 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1
1
( ) ( ) 2 log z z
σ
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+
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−
    − − − − − =      
. 
Substituting the normalization 
  1/2
1 1 ( ) z σ τ ζ τ µ τ + + − = − +  
then gives 
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1
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−
    − − − − =      
. 
￿ 
 
Since large observations are good news, punishment occurs when observations 
take on intermediate values so 
    ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) p τ ζ τ ζ τ = Φ −Φ  
and 
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    + − + −      = Φ −Φ             
 
Proposition 6: a) There is a  1 λ >  such that if  1 1 1 / σ σ λ + − < <  there is no non-
trivial limit equilibrium. 
    b) If  1 1 / 1 σ σ + − >  there is no efficient patient equilibrium. 
 
Proof: Suppose there is a non-trivial equilibrium; then as we indicated in the discussion 
after Lemma 1, we know that  ( ) 0 p τ →  and since  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 p τ ζ τ ζ τ = Φ − −Φ − → , 
it follows that  ( ) ( ) 0 ζ τ ζ τ − → . From the quadratic  formula  and  Lemma 8, we can 
compute 
 
1 1 1 1/2
2 2
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2( )
( ) ( )
µ µ σ
ζ τ τ ζ τ
σ σ
− + +
+ −
−
= − −
−
,   26 
from which it follows that  ( ) ( ) 0 ζ τ ζ τ + → , so we conclude that  ( ), ( ) 0 ζ τ ζ τ → . 
Now we calculate ρ 
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By the mean value theorem, we can find  ( ) *( ), * *( ) ( ) ζ τ ζ τ ζ τ ζ τ ≤ ≤  such that 
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, 
where the final step follows from  ( ), ( ) 0 ζ τ ζ τ → , implying  *( ), * *( ) 0 ζ τ ζ τ → . So 
we conclude that there is no efficient patient equilibrium, and that there is no non-trivial 
limit if  
  1 1
1
/( ) g u u
σ σ
ρ
σ
+ −
−
−
= ≤ − . 
￿ 
 
7. Conclusion 
  To  recapitulate  our  conclusions,  we  repeat  Table  1’s  description  of  the  most 
efficient limit equilibria:     27 
 
   
  Poisson  Diffusion  Diffusion, constant variance  
Bad News  Non-trivial  Efficient  Trivial 
Good News  Trivial  Non-trivial  Trivial 
   
Notice that with the exception of the constant-variance knife-edge, the most efficient 
equilibrium is more efficient if there are more events in a given time period (comparing 
Poisson vs. diffusion on a given row) and also more extreme signals are bad news. The 
first comparison is suggestive of a more general result about aggregation of signals being 
beneficial; this is a focus of the companion paper. Notice also that our approach here 
relies on the assumption that both agents simultaneously observe the state and revise  
their chosen action. The simultaneity allows us to use the techniques of discrete-time 
repeated games with publicly observed signals. It would be interesting to study the harder  
case where agents sample and revise at random times, and do not observe the times of the 
other agent’s revision opportunities; this would result in a game of imperfect and private 
monitoring.     28 
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